New Directions for Self-destructing Data
Technical Report , UW-CSE-11-08-01, University of Washington, August, 2011
This paper seeks to advance the state of the art in practical selfdestructing data systems that secure sensitive data from disclosure in our highly mobile, social-networked, cloud-computing world. Our work facilitates the automatic, timed, and simultaneous destruction of all copies of a self-destructing data object (such as a message or file) without any explicit action by the user and without relying on any single trusted third party.
We make three contributions to the study of self-destructing data. First, we present Cascade, an extensible framework for integrating multiple key-storage mechanisms into a single self-destructing data system. Cascade enhances resistance to attack by combining the security advantages of a diverse set of key-storage approaches. Second, we introduce Tide, a new key-storage system for self-destructing data that leverages the ubiquity and easy deployment of Apache Web servers throughout the Internet. Third, based on our earlier work on Vanish and in light of recent attacks against the Vuze DHT, we demonstrate how to significantly harden Vuze and other DHTs against Sybil data-harvesting attacks, making DHTs applicable as key-storage systems under Cascade.
To validate our approach, we designed, implemented, deployed, and measured these systems. We prototyped the extensible Cascade system with support for Tide, Vuze, and OpenDHT. We prototyped the Tide key-storage system on Apache, deployed it on over 400 PlanetLab nodes in the Internet, and demonstrated that the structure is highly immune to attack. Finally, we designed and deployed a set of defenses to Sybil data-harvesting attacks in the live Vuze P2P system and measured them at full scale in the million-node DHT; our results demonstrate that these defenses provide a three-orderof- magnitude improvement over the original Vuze DHT, rendering data-harvesting attacks extremely impractical.tr10geambasu